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In the eighteenth century one of the major exponents of the economic doctrine of utilitarism, Jeremy Bentham 
(1789), proposed that the major drive of human action is the attempt to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and that happiness 
depends on the outcome of this effort. He also tried to build a science of happiness on the basis of the idea that pleasure 
and pain can be measured along specific dimensions such as intensity, duration, and uncertainty. Moreover, he proposed 
to regard this science as a guide for economic policy. In his epistemological reorganisation of welfare economics, 
Lionell Robbins (1932) completely rejected these ideas and the possibility of having a cardinal measure of utility, and 
in place of them proposed new founding principles that later became the core of ordinal theory of utility and the pillars 
of modern neoclassical welfare economics (Screpanti & Zamagni, 1989): (1) subjective quantities such as happiness 
and utility cannot be the object of rigorous scientific observation and measurement: the only information we can get on 
people utility can be acquired through the observation of their behaviours, in particular the observation of the way they 
rank things according to their preferences, revealed by their observable choices (e.g., if an agent chooses A we cannot 
know the exact value it assigns to it, but if she chooses A in alternative to B, this means that it assigns to A a higher 
value than B); (2) for the same reasons, it is impossible to carry out any inter-agent utility comparison on an objective 
basis (as a corollary, this withdraw any scientific justification to redistribution policies). These principles were in line 
with the tendency, henceforth generally accepted in economics, to deny any possibility of accessing and modelling 
people’s mental processes (in line with the behaviourist paradigm that dominated psychology at that time), and hence to 
consider agents’ preferences and cognitive processes as being out of the scope of investigation of economics (Camerer, 
2006). Technically, this implied that models had to treat all such factors as a black box with exogenous variables.  
The paper presents a number of claims that point out how this state of affairs is radically changing due to 
important empirical, technical, and theoretical innovations taking place in various disciplines such as psychology, 
neuroscience, artificial intelligence and computer science. The paper will present detailed arguments, corroborated by a 
review of the relevant literature, in support of these claims (cf. also Kahneman et al., 1999; Layard, 2003; Camerer, 
2006). For space constraints, these arguments and the related literature can be only briefly listed and sketched here. 
1) The advent of new neuroscientific techniques, and the research carried out with traditional ones, is boosting the 
possibility of understanding brains’ neural correlates of people’s behaviours, decision making, and emotional 
processes, and of subjective phenomena such as pleasure, pain, attribution of value to things, happiness, and well-
being. For example the techniques of single-cells recording, brain targeted lesioning, and psychopharmacology are 
building a coherent broad picture of the network and functioning of brain systems (e.g., insula, amygdala, 
orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia and in particular nucleus accumbens) that underlie animal and human behaviour 
guided by pleasure and pain (Cardinal et al., 2002; cf. Klein, 2003, for a gentle introduction), the attribution of 
value to things (Schioppa & Assad, 2006), and decision making processes (Bechara et al., 1999). Other non-
invasive techniques, such as the new brain imaging techniques (as fMRI, PET) and the classic neuropsychological 
techniques based on accidental/pathological brain damages (but also the new TMS), are furnishing important 
knowledge on the neural correlates of well-being (Davidson, 2004) and decision making (Sanfey et al., 2003).  
2) The knowledge from neurosciences will also give new strength to previous and current psychological investigations 
carried out on people’s behaviours relevant for economics. Psychology has been producing important knowledge 
relevant for microeconomic assumptions on agent’s cognitive processes (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; Simon, 
1982; Simon, 1997; Kahneman, 2003), but until recently they have been considered marginal by mainstream 
economics, probably because psychological empirical evidence, for the difficulty of the object of its study, is not so 
compelling as that of the “hard sciences”. Now the insights of neuroscientific research are giving new strength to 
psychology’s results. For example the interview-based works investigating the relation existing between income 
and well-being (Inglehart & Klingemann, 2000) are assuming a more solid scientific reliability because of the 
studies on the high correlation existing between reported well-being the neural correlates behind it (Davidson, 
2004); similarly behavioural studies on attribution of value to things (Schioppa et al., 2006) are being corroborated 
by studies using single cell recordings (Schioppa & Assad, 2006). 
3) These empirical outcomes give the opportunity to, and at the same time urge, economics to adopt new micro-
economic foundations, in particular by developing models of agent’s cognitive and emotional processes based on 
empirical evidence (Simon, 1982; Simon, 1997; Kasser, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Camerer, 2006), so as to 
overcome the no-more-acceptable limitations and simplifications of “perfect rationality”, “representative agent” 
and “as if” assumptions (Friedman, 1953) adopted by mainstream economics so far. 
4) Mathematical models, the main tool used by economics for presenting, formalising, and testing the soundness of 
theories, are ill suited for integrating, in an interdisciplinary framework, the knowledge generated by neuroscience 
and psychology related to agents’ cognitive and emotional processes and the knowledge generated by social 
sciences related to the functioning of socio-economic (complex) systems: agent-based models and simulations have 
to be used for this purpose (Baldassarre, 1997). In fact, agent-based simulation models: (a) allow representing and 
studying non-linear complex adaptive systems, such as brains and socio-economic systems (Arthur et al., 1997), 
that cannot be studied analytically; (b) they have a huge representational capacity of phenomena, limited only by 
the (steadily increasing) computational power of computers: this allows representing in the same model complex 
socio-economic systems and agents with sophisticated cognitive and emotional processes. 
5) With respect to the latter point, the modelling of agents’ cognitive and emotional processes can be greatly enhanced 
by the use of architectures and algorithms proposed by artificial intelligence (in particular the “new” artificial 
intelligence based on neural-networks, cf. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) and computational neuroscience (the 
theoretical branch of neuroscience that formulates theories on brain based on computational models, cf. the 
“Journal of Computational Neuroscience”). These areas of investigation are presenting very interesting 
computational models, for example the actor-critic reinforcement learning architectures (Sutton & Barto, 1998) that 
can be used to mimic trial-and-error learning and decision making (Houk et al., 1995; Mannella & Baldassarre, in 
press), or emotional and motivational processes (Daw et al., 2005), in animals and humans. 
6) Altogether, and most important for this conference, these trends open again the possibility of pursuing the policy-
making agenda proposed by the classic exponents of utilitarism: “aiming for the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number”. Indeed, this goal was abandoned by neoclassic economics because of the aforementioned technical 
limitations, not for its lack of moral desirability. With this respect, the analyses presented in the paper demonstrate 
that people’s happiness can be now be (re-)considered the possible ultimate goal of policy making on the basis of 
rigorous scientific grounds (cf. also Kahneman et al., 1999; Seligman et al., 2000; Frey & Stutzer, 2002). 
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